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Abstract
Delayed comparison tasks are widely used in the study of working memory and perception in psychology and neuroscience.
It has long been known, however, that decisions in these tasks are biased. When the two stimuli in a delayed comparison
trial are small in magnitude, subjects tend to report that the first stimulus is larger than the second stimulus. In contrast,
subjects tend to report that the second stimulus is larger than the first when the stimuli are relatively large. Here we study
the computational principles underlying this bias, also known as the contraction bias. We propose that the contraction bias
results from a Bayesian computation in which a noisy representation of a magnitude is combined with a-priori information
about the distribution of magnitudes to optimize performance. We test our hypothesis on choice behavior in a visual
delayed comparison experiment by studying the effect of (i) changing the prior distribution and (ii) changing the
uncertainty in the memorized stimulus. We show that choice behavior in both manipulations is consistent with the
performance of an observer who uses a Bayesian inference in order to improve performance. Moreover, our results suggest
that the contraction bias arises during memory retrieval/decision making and not during memory encoding. These results
support the notion that the contraction bias illusion can be understood as resulting from optimality considerations.
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Introduction
Comparing magnitudes of two temporally separated stimuli is
one of the fundamental tools of experimental psychology and
neuroscience. Interestingly, choice behavior in these experiments
reveals a fundamental bias: when the first stimulus is small,
subjects tend to overestimate it, whereas when it is large, they tend
to underestimate it. The first account of this bias, known as the
contraction bias, was published a century ago by Harry Levi
Hollingworth who later became one of the pioneers of applied
psychology. Hollingsworth presented subjects with square cards of
various sizes for a brief period of time and asked them to
memorize their sizes [1]. Each card presentation was followed by a
short delay, after which the subjects selected a matching card from
a set of probe cards. Surprisingly, Hollingsworth observed that
subjects tended to choose a probe card that was too large when the
memorized card was small compared to the other cards used in the
experiment, whereas the opposite behavior, i.e. picking too small a
probe card, was observed when the memorized card was relatively
large. This illusion has been demonstrated numerous times since
Hollingworth’s publication for a variety of analog magnitudes in
the visual, auditory, and somatosensory modalities [1–7, for review
see 8].
The customary explanation for the contraction bias is that the
perceived magnitude of a stimulus is a weighted combination of its
veridical magnitude and a reference magnitude, such as an
average of all contextually relevant stimuli, that serves as an
anchor [3,9, but see 10]. Thus in Hollingsworth’s experiments and
others [1–5] the anchor is thought to make a larger contribution to
the subjective magnitude of the memorized stimulus than to the
subjective magnitude of the probe stimulus. As a result, the
memorized stimulus is biased towards the anchor more than the
probe stimulus, which results in the overestimation of small
memorized stimuli and the underestimation of large memorized
stimuli. This explanation, however, is at best partial since there is
no consensus on the choice of the contextually relevant stimuli that
comprise the anchor, or on the relative weights of the physical and
reference magnitudes. Moreover, it is not clear why the weight
applied to the memorized stimulus should be different from the
weight applied to the probe stimulus. Finally, the computational
principles underlying this bias remain unknown. In order to
address these questions we explored whether the contraction bias
can be understood as resulting from optimality considerations.
There is a growing body of literature suggesting that the brain
utilizes Bayes’ rule to optimally combine information from
different sources [11–18]. In particular, the application of Bayes’
rule has been demonstrated in slant perception [19], sensorimotor
learning [20], speed estimation [18], time estimation and interval
timing [21], motion perception [22], and integration of informa-
tion from different sensory modalities [12,23]. In addition, it has
been suggested that Bayesian inference underlies the effect of
categories on behavior in reconstruction tasks [24]. Therefore, we
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hypothesized that the contraction bias in delayed comparison tasks
results from a Bayesian inference in which noisy representations of
stimuli are combined with knowledge about the a-priori
distribution of magnitudes in order to optimize performance.
Intuitively, such an inference should lead to the contraction bias
because the perception of extreme magnitudes of the first stimulus,
which are unlikely given unimodal prior distributions, will be
biased toward the ‘center’ of the prior distribution.
In order to test this hypothesis, we conducted an experiment in
which we instructed subjects to memorize the length of a bar
presented on a computer screen and then compare this memorized
length to the length of a probe bar. We show that contraction bias
depends on the prior distribution of bar lengths, and increasing the
uncertainty in the memory of bar lengths enhances the contraction
bias, both of which are consistent with the Bayesian hypothesis.
When within a trial does the Bayesian computation take place?
Is the encoded memory biased or does the prior information bias
the result of the length comparison? By manipulating uncertainty
in the memory of bar lengths after memory encoding and
measuring the magnitude of the contraction bias we demonstrate
that prior information is introduced during memory retrieval/
decision making rather than when the first stimulus is encoded in
memory.
Some of the findings presented here have appeared previously
in abstract form [25].
Results
Example of Contraction Bias
In the standard task (Figure 1A), subjects viewed a horizontal
bar (L1) for 1 sec and were instructed to memorize its length. After
a delay of 1 sec, during which screen remained blank, they viewed
a probe bar (L2). The probe bar remained visible on the screen
until subjects reported which of the two bars was longer by
pressing dedicated keys on the keyboard. The first bar, L1, was
drawn from a uniform distribution in the logarithmic scale
between 150 and 600 pixels. The difference in length between L1
and L2 varied between 230% and +30%. Both bars were
presented at random locations on the screen and no feedback was
provided to the subjects on performance on individual trials (See
Materials and Methods). We quantified the proficiency of
individual subjects on the delayed comparison task by measuring
psychometric curves that depict the percentage of ‘L1.L2’
responses as a function of the difference between the memorized
and probe stimuli. The average psychometric curve of the subjects
(n = 9) is plotted in Figure 1B, showing that accuracy improved as
the absolute difference between the lengths of L1 and L2 increased.
Our purpose is to quantify the contraction bias in these
experiments. Previous studies have demonstrated a contraction
bias in delayed comparison tasks by showing that the pattern of
errors made by subjects depends on the magnitude of the
memorized stimulus. When the memorized stimulus is small,
subjects tend to make more errors in trials in which the probe
stimulus is larger than the memorized stimulus, compared to trials
in which the probe is smaller than the memorized stimulus. The
opposite behavior is observed when the magnitude of the
memorized stimulus is large [1–5]. However, these errors only
provide a qualitative measure of the bias because the number of
errors depends on the relative difficulty of the task, i.e., the
difference between the two stimuli (L1 and L2 in our experiments)
relative to the width of the psychometric curve. We used a
different approach to overcome this limitation: Unbeknownst to
the subjects, we included a subset of trials in which the lengths of
the two bars were identical. We term these trials ‘‘impossible
Figure 1. The delayed comparison task and subjects’ perfor-
mance. A, The standard task. Subjects viewed a horizontal bar (L1) on a
computer screen for 1 sec and memorized its length. After a delay
period of 1 sec, during which the screen remained blank, the subjects
viewed a second bar (L2) and were instructed to report which of the two
bars was longer. The second bar, L2 remained visible until subjects
made a response. The difference in length between L1 and L2 varied
between 230% and +30%. Unbeknownst to the subjects, on roughly
50% of the trials, the lengths of the first and second bars were equal
(L1 = L2). B, The average psychometric curve of 9 subjects. The abscissa
corresponds to the difference between the two bar lengths,
L2{L1ð Þ=L1 and the ordinate corresponds to the fraction of trials in
which subjects chose L1 as longer than L2. Error bars depict standard
error of the mean (SEM). Line is a least-square fit of an error function:
Pr 0L1wL2 0ð Þ~ 1
2
: 1{erf
L2{L1ð Þ=L1{mﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
s
  
where m~{0:013 and
s~0:11. C, Average response curve of 9 subjects. Fraction of times in
which subjects reported ‘L1.L2’ on the impossible trials are plotted as a
function of bar length. Subjects overestimated the magnitude of the
memorized L1 bar when it was relatively small and underestimated L1 when
it was relatively long, consistent with the contraction bias. Each data point
corresponds to 21 impossible trials per subject. Error bars depict SEM.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019551.g001
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trials’’ because there is no correct answer to the question ‘‘which
bar (L1 or L2) was longer’’. Impossible trials are well suited for the
analysis of the contraction bias because performance on these trials
is independent of the proficiency of individual subjects in
distinguishing the difference in the length of the two bars.
The average response curve of 9 subjects is depicted in
Figure 1C, where we plot the percentage of trials in which the
subjects reported that ‘L1.L2’ as a function of the length of L1
(L1 = L2). Note that despite the fact that L1 and L2 were identical
on these trials, subjects reported that L1 was longer than L2 on
roughly 60% of the shortest trials (left-most point in Figure 1C)
whereas they reported L1 was longer than L2 only in 28% of the
longest trials (right-most point in Figure 1C). The slope of the
regression line fitted to the impossible trials was significantly
smaller than zero (mean slope =20.28, 95% bootstrap confidence
interval (CI) = [20.36, 20.21], see Materials and Methods for
procedure), indicating that subjects were more likely to report
‘L1.L2’ for shorter L1 bars as compared to longer L1 bars, thus
exhibiting the contraction bias.
Bayesian Inference and Contraction Bias
Our aim is to account for the contraction bias in a Bayesian
framework of decision making. In order to see how the contraction
bias emerges from Bayesian inference, we consider a control
region in the brain, such as the prefrontal cortex [26], that is
presented with the neural representations of L1 and L2 and has to
decide which of the two bars is longer. We assume that: (1) the
control region knows that the neural representations of L1 and L2
are noisy, e.g. due to noise in the sensory pathway. Moreover the
representation of L1 is noisier than that of L2 because L1 has to be
stored in memory, a process that may contribute additional noise
to the representation of L1; (2) the control region has information
about the marginal distribution of bar lengths. This distribution
can be approximated based on the history of the experiment; (3)
the control region utilizes Bayes’ rule and combines the noisy
representations of L1 and L2 with knowledge about the prior
distribution in order to construct the posterior distributions for the
two bar lengths. These posteriors are then used to minimize error
in judgment. A formal description of this process appears in the
Materials and Methods section. To illustrate how the contraction
bias could emerge from such a Bayesian computation, we consider
the following three examples:
(1) L1 is unknown, L2 is known. Consider a hypothetical
subject who forgets the length of L1, but has no ambiguity
about the length of L2, i.e., the neural representation of L1 is
infinitely noisy whereas there is no noise in the neural
representation of L2. In this case, the posterior of L1 is the
prior distribution. In contrast, the prior distribution makes no
contribution to the posterior of L2. Therefore, the optimal
strategy would be to report ‘L1.L2’ in trials where L2 is
smaller than the median of the prior distribution and to report
‘L1,L2’ in trials in which L2 is larger than the median.
Therefore, in the impossible trials in which L1 = L2, the subject
would report ‘L1.L2’ if L1 is smaller than the median of the
prior distribution and would report ‘L1,L2’ otherwise, as
depicted in Figure 2A. This response pattern is consistent with
the contraction bias because it appears as though the subject is
overestimating relatively small L1 and underestimating
relatively large L1.
(2) L1 and L2 are equally uncertain. Consider a case where
the estimated uncertainties in the representations of L1 and L2
are equal. This would be true if the only uncertainty in the
representations of L1 and L2 results from sensory noise, and
memory storage does not add any additional noise to the
representation of L1. In the impossible trials in which the two
bars are physically identical, the contribution of the prior
distribution to the posteriors of L1 and L2 is equal. Symmetry
considerations indicate that the subject would report that
‘L1.L2’ at chance level for all bar lengths, i.e., there is no
contraction bias, as depicted in Figure 2B.
(3) L1 is less certain than L2. In intermediate cases where the
level of uncertainty in L1 is larger than that of L2, for example,
as a result of added noise due to memory storage, we expect
the resultant response curve to reside between the response
curves of Figures 3A and 3B, resulting in a smooth decrease in
Figure 2. Bayesian inference and the contraction bias. A,
Response curve of a Bayesian model with infinite noise in the
representation of L1 (no memory of L1) and no noise in representation
of L2. The model reports ‘L1.L2’ in trials where L2 is smaller than the
median of the prior distribution, and ‘L1,L2’ in trials in which L2 is larger
than the median. This behavior arises because the posterior distribution
of L1 is the same as the prior distribution of the bar lengths, whereas
the posterior distribution of L2 is not influenced by the prior at all. B,
Response curve of the Bayesian model with equal noise in the
representations of L1 and of L2. The contribution of the prior to the
posteriors of L1 and L2 is identical because the levels of noise in the two
representations are equal. Thus, in trials where L1 = L2, the model
reports ‘L1.L2’ at chance level independently of the length of the bars.
C, Response curve of the Bayesian model assuming that there is more
noise in the representation of L1 than in representation of L2. Response
curve is a combination of A and B.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019551.g002
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the fraction of trials in which L1 is reported to be larger than
L2 as a function of the lengths of L1 and L2 (Figure 2C).
Model Predictions and Behavioral Results
Effect of Changing the Prior. If the contraction bias results
from Bayesian inference, then changing the prior distribution is
expected to change the response curve. In particular, assuming
that noise is independent of the length of the bars, a translational
shift in the prior distribution would result in an equal translational
shift in the response curve without changing its shape. To test this
prediction, we asked a new group of naı¨ve subjects to participate in
the experiment of Figure 1A, in which L1 was drawn from a new
uniform distribution in the logarithmic scale between 50 and 200
pixels (n = 10). Similar to the first experiment, all lengths were
presented in logarithmic scale to satisfy the assumption of
independence of noise and bar length. We compared the
responses of this group to the original group who saw stimuli
that were drawn from a uniform distribution in the logarithmic
scale between 150 to 600 pixels. The accuracy of subjects in the
trials in which L1?L2 (non-impossible trials) was indistinguishable
between the two groups (83%62% for 50–200; 85%61% for
150–600; t17 = 0.69, p = 0.49, two-tailed), supporting the
assumption that the level of noise in the neural representation of
the bars is independent of bar length in these ranges. Response
curves for the two groups in the impossible trials are depicted in
Figure 3 (50–200 pixels: open circles; 150–600 pixels: filled circles).
The slope of a regression line fitted to the response curve for the
50–200 pixel group was significantly smaller than zero (mean
slope =20.20, 95% bootstrap CI = [20.27, 20.13]). Response
curve slopes were not significantly different between the group
who saw 50–200 pixel lines and the original group who saw 150–
600 pixel lines (average difference =20.08; 95% bootstrap
CI = [20.19 +0.02]). Thus, as predicted by the Bayesian
hypothesis, a translational shift in the prior distribution resulted
in a translational shift in the response curve.
Qualitatively, the shape of the response curve does not seem
linear. Rather, the slope of the curve is more negative for bar
lengths at the high and low ends of the spectrum. The non-linear
response curve is consistent with our Bayesian model whose two
parameters, the level of noise in the representation of the two bars,
were chosen to minimize the fit mean square error. The resultant
parameters indicate that the uncertainty in the representation of
L1 is 30% higher than the uncertainty in L2 (Materials and
Methods). Moreover, the Bayesian model is qualitatively similar to
the experimental results, supporting our hypothesis that the
contraction bias results from Bayesian inference.
Effect of Noise. According to the Bayesian hypothesis, the
contraction bias emerges because the contribution of the prior
distribution to the posterior of the first bar is larger than the
contribution of prior to the posterior of the second bar. This
asymmetry results from the fact that the uncertainty in the
representation of the memorized bar, L1, is larger than that of the
probe bar, L2. The larger the asymmetry in the contribution of the
prior to the posteriors of the two bars, the more pronounced the
contraction bias should be. Therefore, increasing the level of noise
in the representation of L1 is expected to enhance this asymmetry
and thus enhance the contraction bias.
To test this prediction, we modified the task of Figure 1A and
added a distracting memory task between the presentations of the
two bars in randomly selected half of the trials: 500 msec after the
disappearance of L1, four different colors were flashed on the
screen in a random order for 400 msec each (Figure 4A). Then,
subjects were instructed to recall the n’th presented color, where n
was a number between 1 and 4, appearing on the screen
immediately after the last color. Following the answer, L2 was
presented and subjects were instructed to compare it with L1 as
before. On average, subjects correctly recalled the color in 96% of
the trials indicating that the color task was not disregarded.
The distracting task was designed to interfere with the memory
of the first bar. In the Bayesian framework, it was intended to add
‘noise’ to the representation of L1. As predicted, accuracy of
performance on the bar comparison task, measured in the trials in
which L1?L2, was lower on the trials interrupted by the secondary
task compared to the performance on trials that were not
interrupted by the secondary task (Figure 4B). This decrease in
performance was significant both in the easiest trials in which the
difference between L1 and L2 was 630% (p~3|10
{7, two-tailed
t-test), the intermediate trials in which the difference between L1
and L2 was 615% (p~4|10
{4, two-tailed t-test) and the most
difficult trials in which the difference between L1 and L2 was
67.5% (p~6|10{4, two-tailed t-test).
In order to characterize the effect of the secondary task on the
contraction bias, we compared the response curve of subjects in
the impossible trials with interference from the secondary task
(open circles in Figure 4C) with the response curve of the same
subjects in the impossible trials with no interference from the
secondary task (filled circles in Figure 4C). The slope of the linear
fit to the response curve in trials devoid of the secondary task was
20.19 (95% bootstrap CI = [20.32,20.07]). In contrast, the slope
of the linear fit to the response curves in trials with the secondary
task was 20.63 (95% bootstrap CI = [20.75, 20.53]), which was
significantly more negative than the slope in trials without the
secondary task (average difference =20.45; 95% bootstrap
CI = [20.61 20.28]). These results suggest that, as predicted by
the Bayesian model, an increase in internal noise, which manifests
as a decrease in behavioral accuracy, is associated with an increase
in the level of contraction bias, which manifests as an increase in
the magnitude of the slope of the response curve. To further test
this hypothesis, we examined the accuracy of performance on an
Figure 3. Effect of the prior on the response curve. Assuming
that noise is independent of bar length, the model predicts that the
shape of the response curve is independent of the physical range of the
stimuli. Thus, a lateral shift in the prior would result in a lateral shift in
the response curve. Two groups of subjects completed the task in
Figure 1A for two overlapping uniform priors, 50 to 200 pixels (open
circles) and 150 to 600 pixels (filled circles). The response curve in the
impossible trials was not significantly different between the two
groups. Each data point corresponds to 14 impossible trials per subject.
Error bars depict SEM. Lines are the best fit of the Bayesian model, see
Materials and Methods.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019551.g003
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individual basis by fitting a psychometric curve (cumulative
Gaussian function similar to Figure 1B ) to the responses of each
subject, once in trials with and then in trials without the distracting
task, and estimating the width of the psychometric curve (s) in
each case. Next, we calculated the correlation between the slope of
the linear fit to the response curve of each subject (i.e. the
magnitude of contraction bias) and their respective psychometric
s. The correlation coefficient between values of s and the slopes
of the response curves was 20.74 (p = 0.0002, two-tailed),
supporting the assertion that a decrease in performance is
associated with an increase in the magnitude of the contraction
bias.
Discussion
We examined the hypothesis that the contraction bias in
delayed comparison tasks results from a Bayesian inference in
which information about the prior distribution is combined with
noisy measurement in order to optimize performance. This
hypothesis makes two predictions: a translational shift in the prior
distribution is expected to result in a similar translational shift in
the bias curve, and increasing noise in memory is expected to
increase reliance on prior knowledge and thus increase the bias.
Our results are consistent with both predictions, suggesting that
the contraction bias results from a Bayesian inference.
Within a single trial, when does information about the prior
distribution combine with the sensory measurement? One
possibility is that it takes place during the encoding of L1. In this
case, the encoded memory of L1 is already biased in the direction
of the prior distribution. Another possibility is that the memory of
L1 is unbiased and the Bayesian computation takes place at the
comparison stage, when the encoded L1 is compared with L2. To
address this question we again considered the choice behavior of
subjects in the experiment with the interfering task. We found that
in this experiment, the slope of the response curve was more
negative in trials with interference from the secondary task,
compared to the standard trials (Figure 4C). In other words, more
weight was given to the prior distribution in trials interrupted by
the secondary task. Recall that trials containing this task were
randomly intermixed with trials that did not contain interference.
Therefore, at the time of encoding of L1 (up to 0.5 sec after the
end of the presentation of L1) the subjects could not know whether
Figure 4. Effect of noise on the response curve. A, Subjects performed a modified experiment where a secondary task had to be performed
between the presentations of the two bars on randomly selected 50% of the trials. Top row depicts sequence of events in trials with interference: a
sequence of 4 colors was presented on the screen 500 msec after the presentation of L1. Each color was presented for 400 msec and subjects were
instructed to memorize the sequence. 400 msec after the disappearance of the last color, a number from 1 to 4 appeared on the screen. Subjects
were instructed to recall the color that corresponded to the number. B, Percentage correct in bar length comparison in the standard (black) and
modified (red) trials. The ability to memorize the length of L1 was impaired in the modified trials compared to the standard unperturbed trials, in both
the easy (630%, left), intermediate (615%, center) and hard (67.5%, right) trials. These results suggest that the secondary task increased uncertainty
in the memory of the length of L1. C, Response curve in the standard (filled circles) and modified trials (open circles). The larger slope of the response
curve on the modified trials compared to the standard trials suggests that the secondary task caused an enhancement of the contraction bias. Each
data point corresponds to 6 impossible trials per subject. Error bars depict SEM. Lines are the best fit of the Bayesian model, see Materials and
Methods.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019551.g004
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they would be presented with an interfering task and therefore
could not know what weight to give to the prior distribution.
Therefore, if the computation had taken place at the time of the
encoding of L1, we would have observed no difference in the slope
of the response curve between the two conditions. Therefore, the
Bayesian computation necessarily took place after the interfering
task, at the time of L1 retrieval or later, when L1 and L2 were
compared.
How do subjects learn the prior distribution? In order to address
this question, we compared the level of contraction bias, as
measured by the slope of the response curve, in the first 20
impossible trials to the slope in the last 20 impossible trials for
subjects who completed the experiment in Figure 1A where the
bar lengths were drawn from the 150–600 and 50–200 ranges. We
found no statistical difference in these slopes (20.29 for the first 20
trials; 20.28 for the last 20 trials; average difference =20.01; 95%
bootstrap CI for the difference in slopes, [20.29 0.27]). These
results indicate that the contraction bias emerges within a small
number of trials, suggesting that the prior distribution of bar
lengths in the experiment is estimated using a small number of
trials.
In this study we examined the effect of a translational shift in the
prior, but we did not alter the shape of the prior distribution.
Previous studies have shown that subjects are sensitive to the shape
of the prior distribution in category and sensimotor learning
[20,24]. Consistent with these results, changing the shape of the
prior distribution in our model changes the shape of the response
curve. The extent to which the shape of the prior distribution can
be learned and utilized in Bayesian reasoning, however, awaits
future studies.
Contraction bias in delayed comparison tasks is a common
cognitive illusion observed in many different modalities and under
different experimental conditions [1–8]. In this paper we provide a
normative interpretation of this bias, supported by an experiment
in visual domain. Our results are consistent with a growing body of
literature showing that the brain utilizes close-to-optimal compu-
tational strategies.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
All subjects gave written informed consent using methods
approved by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Commit-
tee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects.
Subjects
Subjects were undergraduate and graduate students from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. All subjects had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and no subjects took part in more than
one of the experiments. Each subject received $10 plus 1 cent for
every correct trial in the experiment for a session lasting less than
an hour.
Stimuli
Stimuli were white horizontal bars on a black background
displayed on a 170 computer screen with a resolution of
10246768. All bars were 3 pixels wide.
Procedure
Subjects sat approximately 60 cm from a computer screen in a
dimly lit room. Each subject completed 400 to 600 trials in one
hour and received feedback on their overall performance after
every 20 trials. No other feedback was provided. In the standard
task, each trial started with the presentation of a L1 at a random
location on the screen for 1 sec. After a delay period of 1 sec,
during which screen remained blank, L2 appeared at another
random location on the screen. L2 remained visible until the
subjects pressed one of two keys indicating which bar was longer.
The difference in length between L1 and L2 varied between 230%
and +30%. Unbeknownst to the subjects, in roughly 50% of the
trials, the lengths of the first and second bars were equal (L1 = L2).
Subjects did not receive feedback on performance on individual
trials. Each trial was followed by a 2 sec intertrial interval during
which the screen remained blank. Two distinct groups of subjects
completed the standard task. One group (n = 9) saw L1 bars chosen
uniformly in the logarithmic scale from the [50, 200] pixel interval,
while the other group (n = 10) saw bars chosen from the [150, 600]
pixel interval.
The modified task was identical to the standard task with two
exceptions: (1) L1 bars were chosen uniformly in the logarithmic
scale from the [100, 400] pixel interval; (2) subjects completed a
distracting memory task between the presentation of L1 and L2 in a
randomly selected 50% of the trials: 500 msec after L1
disappeared, a random sequence of four colors (red, blue, white,
and green) were displayed on the screen for 400 msec each.
400 msec after the disappearance of the last color, a number from
1 to 4 appeared in yellow on the screen. Subjects were instructed
to recall the color that corresponded to the number and press one
of four dedicated keys to indicate this color. L2 appeared 500 msec
after subjects made their color choice.
A Bayesian Model of Contraction Bias
According to our Bayesian hypothesis, the contraction bias
emerges because subjects use Bayes’ law to combine noisy
information about the lengths of the bars with knowledge about
the prior information in order to optimize performance. In this
section we formalize this intuition.
In accordance with Weber’s law, the lengths of the bars are
measured in logarithmic scale. Let Li and Ri be the logarithm of
the length of bar i and its neural representation, respectively. We
assume that this representation is noisy such that Ri~Lizzi
where zi is drawn from a zero-mean Gaussian distribution with
variance s2i , zi*N(0,s
2
i ). This is illustrated in Figure 5A where we
plot the probability of a neural representation Ri for a given
representation of bar length Li~L

i , also known as a likelihood
function and denoted as Pr½RijLi~Li . We assume that the prior
distribution of bar lengths, Pr½Li, is uniform (Figure 5B). Bayes’
rule provides a method for combining information about the prior
distribution with the noisy neural representation, in order to
compute the posterior distribution, Pr½LijRi (Figure 5C). Accord-
ing to Bayes’ rule
Pr½LijRi~Pr½RijLi
:Pr½Li
Pr½Ri ð1Þ
where Pr½Ri~
Ð?
{?
Pr½RijLi:Pr½LidLi.
Given a pair of neural representations, (R1,R2), of the lengths of
the first and second bars, the probability that the first bar is longer
than the second bar is given by
Pr½L1wL2jR1,R2~
ð?
{?
Pr½L’1jR1
ðL’1
{?
Pr½L’2jR2dL’2dL’1 ð2Þ
This is illustrated in Figure 5D where we use a color scale to plot
Pr½L1wL2jR1,R2 for different values of R1 and R2. The black line
Contraction Bias
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corresponds to values of (R1, R2) such that
Pr½L1wL2jR1,R2~0:5. Note that the slope of this curve is
smaller than 1. This results from the assumption that s1ws2,
reflecting the fact that L1 has to be stored in memory, a process
that may contribute additional noise to the representation of L1.
An ideal Bayesian observer, who has access to R1 and R2, would
report ‘L1.L2’ in trials in which Pr½L1wL2jR1,R2w0:5 and
‘L1,L2’ in trials in which Pr½L1wL2jR1,R2v0:5. Therefore, the
probability that a model would report ‘L1.L2’ in a trial in which
L1 and L2 are presented is given by
Pr½0L1wL20jL1,L2
~
ð?
{?
ð?
{?
Pr½R’1jL1:Pr½R’2jL2:Y(R’1,R’2)dR’1dR’2
ð3Þ
where Y(R’1,R’2)~
1 if Pr½L1wL2jR1,R2w0:5
0 otherwise

.
In order to construct the response curve we compute
Pr½0L1wL2 0jL1,L2 (Figure 5E). For further insights into the
Bayesian computation, we consider the simple example in which
the level of uncertainty in the representation of L1 is infinite,
whereas there is no uncertainty in the representation of L2. In
other words, s21?? and s
2
2~0. In this case, Eq. (1) becomes
Pr½L1jR1~Pr½L1 and Pr½L2jR2~d(L2{R2), Eq. (2) becomes
Pr½L1wL2jR1,R2~
Ð?
R2
Pr½L’1dL’1 and therefore the subject
would report would report ‘L1.L2’ if R2 is larger than the median
of L1. In trials in which L1 = L2, Eq. (3) dictates that he would
report ‘L1.L2’ in trials in which L2 is larger than the median and
‘L1,L2’ otherwise.
Data analysis
Slope of line fitted to response curve. All slopes were
computed after normalizing the range of lengths to 0 and 1 in the
logarithmic space.
Bootstrap confidence intervals. We used a pairs bootstrap
resampling procedure [27] in order to calculate confidence
intervals for the slope of the regression lines. The bootstrap
algorithm is as follows: repeated 5,000 times, we sampled (with
replacement) from each subject’s impossible trials in order to
obtain a bootstrap dataset and fitted a regression line to the
averaged response curve of each bootstrap dataset. This procedure
resulted in 5,000 bootstrap slopes that could be used for
calculating a CI for the slope of the regression line fitted to the
experimentally obtained data points. The CIs reported in the text
are 95% basic bootstrap intervals [27].
In order to compare the response curve slopes between subjects
who saw 50–200 pixel lines and those who saw 150–600 pixel lines
we sampled from each group independently using the algorithm
above, and then constructed a 95% confidence interval on the
difference between the bootstrap slopes of the two groups.
In order to compare trials with and without the interference task
we calculated the difference in the bootstrap slope of each subjects’
standard and interfered trials, and found the 95% confidence
interval of this difference. The same method was also used to
compare the slope of the response curve in the first 20 impossible
trials of the experiment to the slope of the response curve in the
last 20 impossible trials of the experiment.
Figure 5. Ideal decision maker solution to the task in Figure 1A. A, The likelihood of a representation Ri given a particular length (here
Li= 0.85, si= 0.24) assuming Ri*N(Li ,s2i ). B, The prior distribution of bar lengths. C, The posterior distribution of Li given a particular measurement
(here Ri=0.85), calculated using Bayes’ rule. D, The probability that L1.L2 for different values of R1 and R2, computed using the posteriors. The black
line corresponds to the values of R1 and R2 such that Pr(L1.L2|R1,R2) = 0.5 (here, s1~0:24 and s2~0:13). E, Response curve of the model on the
impossible trials in which L1 = L2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019551.g005
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Bayesian model fit. In order to compare behavioral
performance to that predicted by the model, we used the model
presented above to generate a set of response curves of ideal
observers characterized by different values of s1 and s2. These
curves were compared to the experimentally measured response
curves as described below:
Note that subjects exhibited a small bias in favor of reporting
‘L2.L1’ in the 50–200 and 150–600 standard experiments.
Subjects reported that ‘L1.L2’ in the impossible trials in 41%
and 46% respectively. This tendency has been reported previously
[28,29]. In principle, such a bias can be explained in our Bayesian
framework by claiming that the prior distribution that the subjects
use in their Bayesian computation is biased in favor of small
magnitudes, as was observed for speed perception [18]. In this
framework, it is predicted that in the modified experiment
(Figure 4A), the global bias should be larger in the trials interfered
by the color task than in the standard trials. In fact we found that
the global bias was larger in the modified trials (42% vs. 38%).
However, this effect was not statistically significant (p = 0.58, two
tailed t-test). More importantly, this explanation is circular because
a bias in the opposite direction could equally well have been
explained by arguing that the prior distribution is biased in favor
of large magnitudes. Therefore we did not attempt to account for
the global bias and subtracted it before fitting, assuming that it is
generated by a different mechanism. Thus, for the purpose of
finding the parameters we added a constant to each of the
response curves to normalize them such that
mean(Pr[‘L1.L2’]) = 0.5. For purposes of comparison, the range
of the logarithm of bar lengths was normalized to lie between 0
and 1 and we used a least square fit to find the parameters that
best fit the population-average experimental data. We found that
the best fit model parameters for the groups who saw 50–200 and
150–600 pixel-long bars were given by s1~0:13, s2~0:1; The
best fits for trials not interfered by the distracting task and those
that had the distracting task were s1~0:11, s2~0:09, and
s1~0:24, s2~0:13, respectively.
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